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Aereo & ivi: The Need For Change to the Current
Copyright Compulsory Licensing Scheme
Michael Page

Introduction:
“Copyright law has abandoned its reason for being: to encourage learning and the
creation of new works. Instead, its principal functions now are to preserve existing failed
business models, to suppress new business models and technologies, and to obtain, if possible,
enormous windfall profits from activity that not only causes no harm, but which is beneficial to
copyright owners.”1 Technology and consumer demand have outpaced the current copyright law,
and there is a glaring need for the development of a new compulsory licensing system to account
for transmission of copyrighted content over the internet.2 “[N]ew, highly popular content
delivery systems that don’t fit comfortably into any existing licensing scheme. And that lack of
fit is not because the folks who designed the existing licensing schemes considered but rejected
inclusion of the new delivery systems. Au contraire, the folks who drafted the existing copyright
laws had no idea that such delivery systems would ever exist.”3 As a result, recent decisions by
the courts have led to technicalities and interpretations which allow for usage and business
models that appear contrary to the legislative intent of Congress and the position stated by the
Copyright Office.4 Changes need to be made to the Copyright laws to allow for both the public to
enjoy copyrighted works through additional avenues and to allow for providers to still be able to
exploit their substantial investments and utilize more cost effective and efficient mechanisms of
distributing the content other than what is currently being prescribed by the courts. Since the

Copyright laws have no express language referencing internet transmission services, courts were
required to analyze legislative history and intent to determine if these internet transmission
services fall within the scope of the current Copyright legislation. Congress should remove the
ambiguity the courts currently encounter when having to analyze new popular technologies in a
Copyright context by adopting amendments to the Copyright Act. As technology has rapidly
developed, new platforms, such as those used over the internet, are created and do not fit into the
existing licensing scheme simply because they did not exist at the time the laws were drafted.
According to a recent study, the average cable television bill is currently $86 per month,
and that cost could rise to $200 by the year 2020.5 The same study has also shown that as
television programming licensing fees have risen, cable television rates have grown an average
of 6 percent while US household income has remained flat over the same timeframe.6
Additionally, a report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics states that in the last 10 years, the cost
of cable and satellite services has increased 43%.7 While high consumer demand for television
programming exists, according to another industry survey, approximately 2.65 million
subscribers canceled their cable TV subscriptions between 2008 and 2011 to opt for low-cost
internet video streaming subscription services or other free video platforms, and they estimate
3.58 million subscribers will cancel their subscriptions in 2012.8 This process of canceling
expensive cable subscriptions in exchange for low-cost TV channel subscription through overthe-air (“OTA”) free broadcast through antenna, or over-the-top (“OTT”) broadcast over the
Internet is commonly referred to as “cutting the cord.”9
In 2011, consumer spending on the streaming video industry in the United States is
estimated to be $2.83 billion, nearly 3 times the amount spent in 2010, and by 2016, industry
estimates have US consumer spending growing to $6.68 billion.10 According to the Digital
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Entertainment Group, total sales in 2012, which included OTT services such as Netflix and Hulu,
rose to $3.94 billion and sales of subscription streaming services rose to $579.2 million.11 These
OTT services typically offer many popular television programs, sometimes the day after its
original broadcast, and there is evidence that suggests people who aren't interested in live
programs such as sports are more prone to cut the cord.12 With the rapid growth the OTT
industry is experiencing and growing consumer demand for alternatives to traditional television
viewing, several startup companies have attempted to deliver a product that provides what
consumers desire, an OTT solution of live network broadcasts.
In September of 2010, ivi, Inc announced the release of its product that “transforms a
computer into a television.”13 The ivi application would enable “anyone with an Internet
connection to "cut the cord" and watch live broadcast television anywhere in the world, anytime.
The easy-to-use, over-the-top (OTT), online cable system is the first traditional television
experience available on the Internet.”14 Amidst the growing number of frustrated cable
subscribers that are seeking alternatives to allow them to “cut the cord” and use an OTT solution,
“ivi offers a fresh, innovative and affordable approach to live television by providing an online
cable system for those consumers who are increasingly expressing discontent with cable's
antiquated content delivery methods, limited options, and high subscription costs.”15
On March 14, 2012 a similar product to ivi’s OTT offering, was launched to residents of
New York City. Aereo, Inc “enables consumers to use an individual antenna to access live, HD
television broadcasts on web-enabled devices and to record up to 40 hours of programming
through their Remote DVR. No cable required.”16 According to Aereo Founder & CEO Chet
Kanojia, “Technology is changing rapidly and consumers have embraced innovation that
simplifies access to entertainment. People no longer want to be tethered to their TVs or cable
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boxes. Consumers are demanding more flexibility and value; Aereo delivers just that. This truly
groundbreaking technology will usher in a new era of choice in the broadcast marketplace,
making the consumers the ultimate winners.”17
As expected, the major broadcast companies filed suit to enjoin these companies from
streaming their programming alleging infringement of their copyrighted works through
unauthorized retransmission.18 Despite the similarities in both companies’ offering, the courts
yielded different results on preliminary injunctions. On February 22, 2011, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York issued a preliminary injunction19 barring ivi from
streaming any of the content protected by the plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under the Copyright
laws. This District Court decision was later affirmed by U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit.20 However, despite the apparent precedent, on July 11, 2012 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York denied a preliminary injunction sought by the same major
broadcast companies against Aereo, Inc.21 The key difference between the two cases lies in not
in what the two companies offered but in how the companies structured their relevant
technology, namely the number of antennas. In order to understand how antennas essentially
allowed Aereo to continue to conduct their business, but prevented ivi from continuing to
operate, a summary of the relevant sections of the Copyright Act and case law will demonstrate
how we arrived at this apparent discrepancy.

Relevant Copyright Law
Section 106 of the Copyright Act of 1976 grants owners of copyright certain exclusive
rights: to reproduce copies of their works; to prepare derivative works based upon their
copyrighted work; to distribute copies of their copyrighted work to the public; to perform the

3

copyrighted work publicly; to display the copyrighted work publicly; and to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.22 These exclusive rights are
subject to limitations outlined in sections 107 through 122 of the Act.23
Section 107 of the Copyright Act limits the exclusive right of the copyright owner if the
use of the copyrighted work is determined to be fair use.24 In order to determine when a
particular use constitutes fair use, the following factors will be considered: the purpose and
character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.25
Section 111 of the Copyright Act establishes a limitation on the exclusive rights of the
Copyright owner by granting an exemption to cable systems and creating a compulsory licensing
scheme for these cable systems and copyright owners. 26 A "secondary transmission" is defined
as "the further transmitting of a primary transmission simultaneously with the primary
transmission." 27 A "cable system" is defined as “a facility…that in whole or in part receives
signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations …, and
makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or
other communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for such
service.”28

Differences between ivi & Aereo rulings. Do internet transmission services such as ivi
qualify as Cable Systems under §111?
ivi captures over-the-air broadcasts of copyright owners television programming and
simultaneously, without the copyright owners’ consent, streams those broadcast signals over the
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Internet to ivi subscribers who have downloaded the ivi TV player.29 ivi claims that they are
entitled to a compulsory license to perform the owners’ over the air broadcast since they are a
“cable system” as defined in Section 111 of the Copyright Act.30 The district court analyzed ivi’s
claim by reviewing the historic context, statutory text, and administrative record.
Prior to Congress enacting the exemption to the Copyright Act in 1976 for the cable
companies, the Supreme Court held that cable retransmissions were not a “performance” for
copyright purposes.31 “Essentially, a CATV system no more than enhances the viewer's capacity
to receive the broadcaster's signals; it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient
connection to the viewer's television set.”32 When the Supreme Court battled with the decision
on how to deal with legislation that could not have accounted for unforeseen technological
advances, it understood that it should not limit itself to reliance on the ordinary meaning of the
statute’s words and legislative history. “…[O]ur inquiry cannot be limited to ordinary meaning
and legislative history, for this is a statute that was drafted long before the development of the
electronic phenomena with which we deal here. In 1909 radio itself was in its infancy, and
television had not been invented. We must read the statutory language of 60 years ago in the
light of drastic technological change.” 33 Later, in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., the Court reaffirmed its decision in Fortnightly and held that cable systems did not
constitute a “performance” under the Copyright Act.34 The distance over which the cable systems
distributed the content did not constitute copyright infringement despite the fact that the
programming was not available through use of an antenna. “[T]he development and
implementation of these new functions, even though they may allow CATV systems to compete
more effectively with the broadcasters for the television market, are simply extraneous to a
determination of copyright infringement liability with respect to the reception and retransmission
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of broadcasters' programs.”35 Following these rulings by the Supreme Court, Congress
recognized the benefits that cable systems provided society by facilitating increased access to
broadcast television, but they also were determined to compensate copyright owners for the
benefit the cable systems were providing consumers.36 Congress codified the current exemption
for cable systems into Copyright Act under § 111.
The WPIX district court examined the congressional intent and guiding principles from
the Copyright Office and concluded that Congress did not intend to sanction the use of a
compulsory license by ivi, which was “a company so vastly different from those to which the
license originally applied.”37 The court cited differences in the ivi’s architecture, in ivi’s
nationwide rather than local reach, and ivi’s refusal to comply with FCC regulations as evidence
of ivi not being able to classify itself as a cable system pursuant to § 111.38
The WPIX court also found the position of the Copyright office regarding Internet
transmissions to be persuasive in arriving to its conclusion.39 The Copyright Office has
consistently concluded that Internet retransmission services are not cable systems and do not
qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses. In 1992, the Copyright Office asserted that Congress
intended that entities who sought compulsory license under §111 would also be subject to FCC
regulations.40 In 1997, the Copyright Office reiterated its position on cable compulsory licenses
for entities regulated by the FCC, and added that the provider of broadcast signals be “inherently
localized transmission media of limited availability to qualify as a cable system.”41 In 2000, the
Register of Copyrights testified before a House Sub-Committee on Courts and Intellectual
Property that retransmission of television programming over the internet were not entitled to §
111 compulsory license since when the §111 was created, it was tailored to an already heavily
regulated industry whereas the internet lacks this sort of regulation.42 In 2008, at the behest of
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Congress, the Copyright Office issued the "Satellite Home Viewer Extension and
Reauthorization Act Section 109 Report" ("SHVERA Report").43 In the SHVERA Report, the
Office again reiterated its previous position.
The Office continues to oppose an Internet statutory license that would permit any
website on the Internet to retransmit television programming without the consent
of the copyright owner. Such a measure, if enacted, would effectively wrest control
away from program producers who make significant investments in content and
who power the creative engine in the U.S. economy. In addition, a governmentmandated Internet license would likely undercut private negotiations leaving
content owners with relatively little bargaining power in the distribution of
broadcast programming.”44
The Copyright Office continued to hold this position in 2011. 45
The WPIX district court proceeded to conclude that since ivi was unlikely to demonstrate
it would be deemed a cable system under §111, WPIX demonstrated a likelihood of success on
the merits, and WPIX’s motion for a preliminary injunction against ivi was granted.46
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant
from live Internet streaming of television programs, holding that the defendant is not entitled to a
compulsory license to stream plaintiffs’ copyrighted programming because it is not a “cable
system” under §111 of the Copyright Act.47 The Second Circuit held that since the statutory text
was ambiguous whether ivi was entitled to a compulsory license under §111, a review of
statute’s legislative history, development and purpose as well as the view of the administrative
agencies that oversee the licensing scheme would provide any guidance.48 After reviewing the
legislative history, the Second Circuit agreed with the lower court and concluded that Congress,
by not expressly altering the language of §111 or codifying a separate provision (e.g. §119 for
satellite providers), did not intend for § 111's compulsory license to extend to Internet
retransmissions.49 The Second Circuit also agreed with the Copyright Office’s interpretation that
internet transmission providers do not constitute cable systems under §111.50
7

The emergence of the DVR, the Cablevision case, and the framework for Aereo’s legal
argument.
In an ironic twist, a cable system provider, Cablevision, established the current judicial
framework for its yet unforeseen competitor, Aereo, in a ruling that shaped the infrastructure
model which Aereo relied on to win its preliminary injunction. In 1999, TIVO launched the
debut of the digital video recorder (DVR) which it later integrated with satellite provider
DirecTV.51 Cable system providers followed suit by providing its customers with set-top DVR
boxes that allow its customers to record programs to these set-top DVR boxes for later viewing.
The Supreme Court previously held that use of recording devices in this context was not
copyright infringement.52 In Sony v. Universal City Studios, the Supreme Court, in 1984, held
that VCRs/BetaMAXs were legal to sell and use even if customers were to use such devices to
record programs to watch at a later time.53 The Court held that practices such as “time-shifting”
(recording live television for later home viewing) constituted “fair use” and were non-infringing
uses. 54
Cablevision decided to take the Sony ruling a step further by moving the recording device
out of the viewer’s home and placing the actual recording device in their own facility.55
Cablevision termed this DVR Plus which was a remote storage digital video recorder (RS-DVR).
The television networks and copyright owners filed suit to enjoin Cablevision from deploying
this RS-DVR alleging that Cablevision infringed upon their exclusive rights to duplicate and
publicly perform their copyrighted works.56 Fox claimed that Cablevision stored a copy of their
copyrighted works on both the Cablevision servers and the RAM of the DVR system, and this
infringed on Fox’s right to reproduce.57 Cablevision argued that this did not constitute
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infringement since they were passive participants in the recording process58 and, similar to the
VCR context in Sony, the end-users initiated the recording process through a process in which
Cablevision provided the technology.59 Additionally, Fox claimed that Cablevision violated their
exclusive right to perform their copyrighted works publicly when Cablevision transmitted copies
of the copyrighted programs to the end users without permission.60 Cablevision argued that they
did not perform the work publicly since it was the end-user who determined what to record, and
even if they did “perform” the work, it was not a public performance since it was transmitted to
only the end-user.61 Under the Copyright Act, “to ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play,
dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible.”62 The Copyright Act defines how a work is performed “publicly” as
either “to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial
number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered;
or to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members
of the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in
separate places and at the same time or at different times.”63
The Fox court held that Cablevision had infringed the exclusive rights of the copyright
owners by making unauthorized copies of the owners’ works which were publicly performed and
required Cablevision to obtain compulsory licenses in order to release its DVR Plus. 64 The Fox
court stated that Cablevision’s reliance on the Sony decision was misguided since the DVR was
not a standalone product in the same way a VCR is.65 Further, a consumer requires the
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“continuing and active involvement” of Cablevision to record the programming on a DVR as
opposed to a VCR which does not require the continued involvement from the manufacturer.66
However, on appeal, Cablevision prevailed.67 First, the Second Circuit reversed the
lower’s court interpretation that Cablevision made unauthorized copies of the copyrighted
programs because the buffer copies stored on Cablevision’s RAM failed to meet the requisite
requirements, embodiment and duration, for the work to be considered “fixed” under the
Copyright Act.68 The Second Circuit used the plain language of the Copyright Act’s definition of
“fixed” to determine that a work must be embodied in a medium that can be perceived or
reproduced and must remain embodied for a period of more than a transitory duration.69 Under
this framework, the Second Circuit determined that while Cablevision’s systems satisfied the
embodiment requirement, these systems did not satisfy the duration requirement since these
“buffer copies” utilized by Cablevision were embodied for only a transitory period and
subsequently discarded.70
Next, the Second Circuit considered the copies of the works stored on Cablevision’s
servers and whether these constituted infringement of the copyright owners’ right to reproduce.
In order for direct liability to have occurred, “something more must be shown than mere
ownership of a machine used by others to make illegal copies. There must be actual infringing
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude
that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”71
The Second Circuit held that the copies produced by Cablevision’s DVR system were made by
the end-user, and Cablevision’s involvement in providing the technology does not amount to
direct liability.
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Lastly, the Second Circuit considered whether through its RS-DVR, Cablevision
transmitted a performance of the copyrighted works to the public.72 The Second Circuit
determined that the relevant fact in establishing whether a transmission is made to the public is to
discern who is capable of receiving the performance being transmitted.73 Cablevision argued that
since a separate copy was stored and playback to the consumer was provided from this separately
stored copy, this does not constitute a transmission to the public.74 So, while the court
acknowledged that Cablevision “performed” the programs by providing the RS-DVR, they did
not transmit them to the “public” since it was stored specifically for the specific end-user that
recorded the program.

What constitutes a private transmission?
In Aereo, plaintiffs, (“ABC”), moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting that Aereo
was directly liable for copyright infringement by publicly performing ABC’s copyrighted works.
Aereo allowed its subscribers to access over-the-air broadcast television through antennas and
hard disks located at Aereo's facilities.75 Unlike ivi, Aereo characterized itself as a technology
platform rather than a cable company. Rather than arguing that its business model is entitled to a
compulsory license under §111 of the Copyright Act, Aereo characterized its offering as a
means whereby subscribers “rent a remotely located antenna, DVR... in order to access content
they could receive for free and in the same manner merely by installing the same equipment at
home.”76 Aereo structured its business model around the Second Circuit Cablevision ruling by
using thousands of individual antennas to capture over the air television transmissions,
dedicating antennas to specific end-users, and storing separate copies of the programs for each
individual user.77 In the context of the Cablevision ruling, Aereo contended that since their
system creates a unique copy of the performance at the request of and transmitted only to a
11

specific end user, that these performances are not to the “public” and as a result, a non-infringing
use of ABC’s performance rights.78
ABC argued that Aereo’s facts should be distinguished from the Second Circuit’s ruling
in the Cablevision case and characterizes Aereo’s system as merely a “technological gimmick.”79
ABC further contended that the copies stored on Aereo's system are “merely facilitating the
transmission of a single master copy—in this case, the broadcast signal—rather than as copies
from which a distinct transmission is made.”80 The district court rejected ABC’s argument
holding that the copies in Aereo’s case are not “materially distinguishable” from the copies in the
Cablevision case, and those same copies were transmitted to the end user as opposed to the
transmission from the over the air broadcast signal.81

What is the Public’s Interest?
The Copyright Owner’s Interest
Since the plaintiffs in both the ivi and Aereo cases were seeking a preliminary injunction,
they were required to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of suffering
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest. While the ivi and Aereo courts came to
different conclusions as to whether plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and, as a result,
potentially be granted a preliminary injunction, both courts came to a similar conclusion on
whether an injunction was in the public interest.
As reiterated in ivi, copyright law inherently balances two competing public interests:
rights of the users in being able to access creative works broadly versus the rights of the
copyright owners in rewarding and incentivizing creative efforts.82 In this context, it is the right
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of the public to access television programming through other avenues besides the traditional
television set versus the copyright owners’ rights to monetize their work and provide an
economic incentive to continue to create programming that may be enjoyed by the public.83 The
district court stated that if the copyright owners would lose control over their works or potential
revenue sources, they would lose valuable incentives to continue to create programming. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited a delicate balance between enabling broad public access
and enabling a convenience to copyright works, and agreed with the district court that granting a
preliminary injunction against the defendant would not be a disservice to the public since it
would not inhibit the public’s ability to consume but merely makes it less convenient.84
Despite the Aereo court denying a preliminary injunction based on the likelihood of
success on the merits, the Aereo court sided with the copyright owner’s interest and agrees with
the ivi court’s analysis of the strong public interest in protecting the financial incentive as
motivation to increase “the store of public knowledge.”85 The Aereo court actually cited the ivi
court’s analysis in preserving the copyright owner’s substantial investment in the development of
these programs.86 Defendants and amici argued that public interest would be disserved by an
injunction since it would limit availability of the programming broadcast; however, the Aereo
court rejected this argument since there are numerous methods for the public to access the
programming other than Aereo’s service.87 The court also rejected the argument put forth by
amici that there is a strong public interest in free access to and reception of broadcast television
noting that while Aereo is a business that may facilitate access to broadcast television, it does not
provide free access to broadcast television and merely facilitating access to copyrighted material
is too broad an argument in favor of a public interest since it would also seemingly include
infringing behavior (i.e. distribution of bootleg copies) that also increases access.88
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The individuals’ rights to access content
In the amici brief on behalf of Aereo, amici also urge the Court to be guided by the
principle that copyright seeks a balance between the owner’s incentives and the public’s right to
access and argues that Aereo’s lawful business does not remove the financial incentive to create
and exploit content since it will not interfere with an advertising based business model.89 Amici
argue that television viewers today have multiple legal methods to “watch TV”: either via the
functionally equivalent traditional TV reception or via personal time-shifting mechanisms which
were found to be non-infringing fair use in Sony.90 Amici further argued that the public
perception of what constitutes “watching TV” is evolving, and regardless of the product or
device used, the Copyright owner could not limit how the customer views a program that he
already has lawful access.91 Amici compared two viewers one sitting at a baseball game with a
portable TV and one sitting in his living room, and by limiting the TV receiver technology that
can be used, the courts would be denying the public the benefits of technological advances.92
Copyright owner’s ability to license their content would still exist, and merely, because a
legitimate competitive offering potentially reduces the licensing fees that these owners would
have collected previously, it does not become a “legally cognizable harm.”93 Amici argue that the
copyright owner’s allegation of Aereo’s continued conduct would result in a loss of advertising
revenue, interference with their ability to collect retransmission fees from cable operators, and
disruption of development with potential markets are unfounded. Amici point out that these same
harms plaintiff allege can occur through lawful introductions of competitive technology.94 Amici
characterize Aereo as a lawful competitive challenge to the established norms, and incumbents
would naturally be resistant to potentially dramatic technological changes to the status quo.95
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Amici further argues that the public interest would not be served by enjoining innovative new
services such as Aereo since it would harm the competition and innovation in a fast-growing
industry with increased consumer demand.96

Examples from other companies & other industries.
2000 - In Twentieth Century Fox v. ICRAVETV, defendant ICRAVE, based in Canada,
was found to have infringed on the exclusive rights of the plaintiff. ICRAVE was enjoined from
transmitting the programming they had received via a single antenna in Canada over the internet
via their website.
2009 – In ABC v. Hang 10 Technologies, CBS Corp., Walt Disney Co.’s ABC and News
Corp.’s Fox television networks dropped a lawsuit against Hang 10 Technologies.97 According to
the complaint, Hang 10 retransmitted programming from WABC-TV, WCBS-TV and Fox’s
WNYW without permission. Hang 10 Technologies Inc. agreed to stop unlicensed transmission
of copyrighted programming from New York City TV stations to subscribers. Hang 10 also
agreed it wouldn’t reproduce the programming and the logos of ABC, CBS and Fox without
authorization. Hang 10 transmitted to mobile phones for $2.99 a month.98 “We are hopeful that
the major broadcasters will see our service as a way to massively increase their revenue since
VuiVision can be viewed anywhere in the world, not just in the United States,” said Hang 10
owner, Daniel Gallic.99
2010 – FilmOn TV launched a product similar to ivi in September of 2010 (an OTT
service which provided subscribers with numerous broadcast television stations and copyrighted
programming from those stations), and the major broadcast networks sought an injunction
claiming that FilmOn TV’s service infringed their exclusive rights under the Copyright Act.100 In
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a settlement reached with the networks, they agreed to a consent judgment and a permanent
injunction was issued on administrative grounds which forced FilmOn to pay $1.6 million to the
major networks.101 However, FilmOn continues to operate, plans to provide its own original
content, and fully intends to add the networks back to their subscription service as a result of the
Aereo ruling by using multiple antennas to receive on-air transmissions.102
2011 – Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys. Here, the internet transmission company,
Zediva, relied on the first sale doctrine which allowed video stores that has purchased DVDs to
rent these DVDs to its customers. Zediva provided its customers with access to DVDs which
Zediva purchased.103 To operate their service, Zediva purchased hundreds of DVD players and
installed them at its data center in Santa Clara, California.104 Subscribers would select the movie
they wished to watch, and Zediva would place the corresponding DVDs in its DVD players, with
each DVD remaining in its respective DVD player while it is transmitted to its subscribers.105
Unlike the other streaming services, Zediva does not convert a movie into a digital file on its
servers that it can distribute to many users. Instead, Zediva compared its service to a brick and
mortar video rental store.106
Unlike the Second Circuit ruling in the Cablevision case, the California district court
ruled that Zediva was transmitting performances of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works, and that these
transmissions were not private transmissions but public transmissions.107 The court cited a
previous case, which involved hotel guests who rented movies in their hotel rooms which stated:
The argument that On Command's system involves not "transmissions" but
"electronic rentals" similar to patrons' physical borrowing of videotapes is without
merit. On Command transmits movie performances directly under the language of
the definition. The system "communicates" the motion picture "images and
sounds" by a "device or process"—the equipment and wiring network—from a
central console in a hotel to individual guest rooms, where the images and sounds
are received "beyond the place from which they are sent." The fact that hotel
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guests initiate this transmission by turning on the television and choosing a video
is immaterial.108
Here, the court used a different basis than the Second Circuit (discern who is capable of
receiving the performance being transmitted, i.e. the end-user) to determine what constituted a
public performance. The court held that Zediva’s transmissions are "to the public" because the
relationship between the transmitter of the performance and its customers, is a commercial,
"public" relationship regardless of where the viewing takes place.109 The non-public nature of the
place of the performance has no bearing on whether or not those who enjoy the performance
constitute "the public" under the transmit clause.110 The court concluded that Warner Bros
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable injury, the balance
of hardships weighed in their favor, and the public interest supported issuance of an injunction
and, as a result, granted the preliminary injunction against Zediva.

Conclusion
[T]these cases demonstrate that the current compulsory licensing system is failing
to keep up with the times. The result is resistance, induced by out-dated laws, to
innovation of new products, services and technology. The results of such
innovation can deliver content from a copyright owner to the consumer and – in
theory at least – the concept of compulsory licenses is designed to facilitate the
legal delivery of that content to the consuming public. But the existing legal
scheme was not designed to, and thus cannot easily accommodate, this fastest
growing area of content delivery. As a result, whenever a good product is created,
the content owners move quickly to restrict its easy implementation.111
It is clear that the evolution of the internet and widespread use of computers have altered the way
in which the public consumes entertainment. There is demand for content to be available through
other means other than traditional means such as a TV and DVD player. It is clear that the
copyright owners have a right and require an incentive to keep producing the content that the
public currently enjoys. They are entitled to licensing and broadcast fees that are now
17

exclusively paid to them by the cable and satellite providers. However, as the law is currently
written and being interpreted by the courts, these outcomes have beed criticized as a “legal
fiction.”
The obvious answer is to change the law. If Modern Family is broadcast to
everyone in the country for free, then why shouldn’t I be able to snatch a copy
that you put online? After all, bits are fungible; if I had recorded the show, then
“my” copy would be exactly the same as “your” copy. Indeed, since all digital
copies are the same, there’s no such thing as my copy and your copy. They’re all
equal. It makes no sense whatsoever, then, that I am allowed to capture Modern
Family when it flies over the air from ABC, but I’m not allowed to do so when it
flies over BitTorrent. It’s a legal inconsistency that’s screaming out for a fix.112
Companies are perpetuating this legal fiction by modeling their businesses to fit the current legal
interpretations of what constitutes fair use, what defines a cable system, and what defines
transmission to the public. “That’s what Aereo does. It perpetuates the legal fiction that digital
copies are somehow distinct.”113 So, while these new companies are essentially offering the
same product, courts have prevented some these businesses from continuing to operate while
allowing others to continue to operate.
These judicial interpretations are razor thin and the discrepancies in interpretations of
what constitutes a transmission to the public by the Cablevision and Zediva courts provide no
value to the content owners, the would-be distributors, and the consumers. In Aereo, it is
perfectly fine for a user to view streaming content over the internet without permission from the
copyright owner as long as individual copies are maintained by the provider for each user.
However, in Zediva, it constitutes infringement if that same provider used a single saved copy to
provide the content to the same end users. Here, there is no difference to the end-user experience,
but a burden is imposed on the provider to maintain multiple copies for each end user. Similarly,
in ivi if you use a single antenna to receive on-air transmissions to rebroadcast over the internet
to multiple users, it constitutes infringement. However, in Aereo, if you use thousands of tiny
18

antennas located on your facility and rebroadcast the transmissions received on those thousands
of tiny antennas to thousands of end users, it is non-infringing. Again, no change to the end user
experience, but an additional burden put on the providers to fit their business model into the
currently inefficient judicial blueprint. These discrepancies in interpretation of the outdated
Copyright laws in Aereo, ivi, Cablevision, and Zediva may eventually lead to a circuit split
between the Second and Ninth Circuits, which would potentially lead to the Supreme Court
issuing an interpretation on the meaning of a transmission to the public. The Supreme Court, in
Fortnightly, stated “While statutes should not be stretched to apply to new situations not fairly
within their scope, they should not be so narrowly construed as to permit their evasion because
of changing habits due to new inventions and discoveries."114
This demonstrates a need to change the law, but how should it be changed? The laws
should be written in a way that is “platform or device neutral” so that the laws do not become
outdated when new technology is developed. Current laws only contemplated that programming
would only be viewed on a television. Congress did not anticipate the proliferation of computers
and mobile devices as potential platforms to “watch TV.”
Historically, Congress has accounted for technological innovations which it did not
previously consider by codifying amendments to the Copyright Act to include innovations such
as cable systems (§111) and satellite providers (§§ 119 and 122). This would resolve the
discrepancy by subjecting these OTT internet providers to the same compulsory licensing
scheme which cable systems and satellite providers are subject to. This would allow companies
like ivi who were willing to pay the necessary compulsory licenses required for a cable system to
continue to operate, to compensate the copyright owners appropriately, to drive innovation
within the industry, and to provide the consumers with a better product.
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Alternatively, Congress could also clarify the meaning of a public performance. This
obviously was written a time when only radio and television were considered, and the
proliferation of new platforms spurred by the internet would not have been known. This would
prevent situations such as the one the OTT and TV industry is facing now when courts must
determine Congressional intent, derive a definition based on different factors, and conclude
different results.
Another more likely alternative would be to completely eliminate or replace the current
compulsory licensing scheme. Congress has already directed the Copyright Office to explore
alternatives to the current compulsory licensing structure and to issue a Report on market based
alternatives to statutory licensing.115 The Report provided recommendations for carrying out a
repeal of the statutory licensing provisions by addressing: (1) possible methods for implementing
a phase-out; and (2) possible mechanisms for ensuring a timely and effective phase-out’ and (3)
possible legislative or administrative actions that may be appropriate in achieving a phase out. 116
A key observation from the Report was the Copyright Office’s determination that while it
did ensure the efficient and cost-effective delivery of television programming in the United
States, the current statutory licensing scheme is an artificial construct created in an earlier era.117
The report advocated for copyright owners to develop marketplace licensing options to replace
the provisions of Sections 111, 119 and 122.118 It acknowledged that business models based on
sublicensing, collective licensing and/or direct licensing are largely undeveloped in the broadcast
retransmission context, but they are feasible alternatives to securing the public performance
rights necessary to retransmit copyrighted content in many instances.119
The first of the marketplace alternatives explored in the Report was sublicensing
agreements. These sublicensing agreements are essentially non-exclusive contracts that would

20

allow a broadcast station to authorize others in the secondary distribution chain to retransmit
performances of all of the programs transmitted on the station’s signal.120 Broadcasters would
have to clear all rights in the programs they carry for ultimate performance by third party
distributors. This clearly would allow for OTT distribution and provides more flexibility to the
current scheme. Of the three alternatives considered by the Copyright Office, sublicensing
seemed to be the “least problematic”, the “most efficient”, and the one with the “most potential”
according to DirectTV, AT&T, and Verizon.121 Sublicensing has also been favored as an
alternative to statutory licensing by both the Copyright Office and the FCC for over twenty
years.122 It is a particularly attractive alternative to statutory licensing insofar as it minimizes
transaction costs associated with a complex marketplace transaction. Sublicensing may also be
the easiest marketplace alternative to implement.123 While the information related to success of
actual sublicensing of programming is limited, the Office concluded that sublicensing of
retransmission rights may not be a significant burden for broadcast stations.124
The second alternative that the Report explored was collective licensing.125 It would
allow copyright owners “to voluntarily join and authorize an organization to: (1) negotiate
licenses with cable operators and satellite carriers for the retransmission of broadcast television
programming; (2) collect royalties for the use of these works; and (3) distribute the royalties
among the respective copyright owners.”126 This would presumably be similar to the design
currently utilized in the radio industry where performing rights organizations such as ASCAP,
BMI and SESAC set the rates, monitor use of the works, and enforce compliance with applicable
obligations. Collective licensing schemes are currently being used in other countries such as
Canada and numerous European countries as either a mandatory or voluntary collective.127 This
model would not require legislation to define a statutory licensing system since the stakeholders
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would negotiate the rates, but it would likely require legislation to authorize the equivalent
performing rights organization to issue licenses and for copyright owners to license their works
through these organizations.128 One of the benefits of this model would be the reduction in
transaction costs through efficiencies in the negotiation process via a centralized organization.129
Another benefit would be the potential knowledge already obtained in the music industry’s
collective licensing scheme. A collective licensing scheme would also have added benefit of
providing the flexibility to charge different rates for different types of uses. Instead of charging
the same statutory rate, the collective agency could charge lower rates for known instances of
lower audiences (e.g. daytime programming, reruns) and higher rates for higher audiences (e.g.
evening programming, special events). A collective organization would also be in a better
position to determine the current market rate because “its decision could be informed by usage
rates, ratings information, or other economic data that is typically used to set licensing fees.”130
Collective agencies could also be formed by the copyright owners of similar content. This would
ensure that each of the similarly situated owners’ interests would be accounted for. “For
example, the professional sports leagues might be inclined to form collective organizations to
license the public performance of football, basketball, baseball, and hockey games that are
shown on broadcast television. Similarly, independent production and distribution companies
could form a collective organization in order to improve their bargaining power relative to the
major user groups.”131 Several of the commenters opposed to the collective licensing scheme
have cited potential monopolization of the content and anti-competitive behavior by the
collective agency as concerns, but the Report stated that “Congress may specifically need to
determine whether there is a potential for anti-competitive practices within the market for the
retransmission of broadcast television programming, and if so…would need to establish ‘rules of
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conduct’ in order to address those concerns.”132 The Report concluded that collective licensing
could work; however, it raised concerns over the lack of a current agency to oversee the process
and merely replacing one form of government supervision with another.133
The last alternative the Report considered was Direct Licensing.134 As the name suggests,
a cable operator or satellite carrier would have to negotiate with each copyright owner of a
specific broadcast program for the right to perform the work publicly.135 Direct licensing was
considered the least practicable option by a majority of the parties due to the cost of obtaining
the rights for each and every type of copyrighted content and it was characterized as a “logistical
nightmare.”136 While the Report acknowledged the potential difficulty a scheme that was
exclusively Direct Licensing would pose, it noted that if used in conjunction with the other
schemes explored, there were potential benefits with this alternative.137 One of the high level
proposals that would coincide with a Direct Licensing model would be the development of a
Digital Copyright Exchange which would provide a centralized licensing database that would
promote efficiencies and reduce risk of infringement.138 While the direct licensing proposal may
superficially appear to be cumbersome, the Report noted that 90% of the content which required
a license was owned by seven companies (CBS, Disney, Discovery, FOX, NBC Universal, Time
Warner, and Viacom).139 The Report still concluded that the remaining 10% of the broadcasting
available would still be a substantial burden for the cable companies and satellite providers to
negotiate licenses and would still likely be prohibitively high given the amount of available
broadcast programming.140 Thus, due to the high transaction cost associated with obtaining that
remaining 10% not held by the major producers, direct licensing for cable companies and
satellite providers does not appear “to be a feasible alternative to acquire the public performance
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rights for all broadcast content for all stations.”141 However, in the context of online distribution
the Report concluded that
[D]irect licensing is the marketplace model widely embraced for online video distribution
and it very much looks like the favored approach to get broadcast and other content to
online video consumers. This is especially true for the younger generation who spend
most of their viewing time on devices besides the television set and at a time of their own
choosing rather than one dictated by a set program schedule. New technologies and new
ways of accessing content must be recognized and be taken into consideration as the
debate about the repeal of the statutory licenses continues.142

The Report also cited a recent examination by the FCC in its approval of Comcast’s acquisition
of NBC Universal in January 2011 which recognized the importance of the emerging online
video marketplace which has expanded opportunities for copyright owners, increased choices
available for consumers, drive innovation within the industry, and lower prices.143
Lastly, the Report acknowledged that “business models may emerge that incorporate
[sublicensing, collective licensing and/or direct licensing] in part or in combination, and
technology will continuously inform the practices of both licensors and licensees.”144 Over time,
marketplace licensing should evolve in a variety of innovative ways, subject to investment and
experimentation in the marketplace.145 Many commenters warned against a one-size fits all
approach to a proposed post-statutory licensing scheme, and the Report acknowledged that a
broadly defined, market-driven, private Hybrid Licensing approach would allow the marketplace
to function efficiently with minimal government interference.146 The Report cited the desire to
avoid any alternative that would merely replace one statutory scheme with another or would
require significant government oversight.147The hybrid approach would allow for the limitations
of any single approach to be balanced with the strengths of the other licensing options, and
provide flexibility within the marketplace to adopt the licensing approach that would best fit the
particular business model of the relevant stakeholder.148
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This solution is the most flexible and, as a result, the most viable since it would face the
least amount of resistance from both Congress and the companies impacted by the change to the
existing licensing scheme. New OTT distributors of content would have knowledge of the
licensing requirements and associated costs to enter the market, and would not have to guess as
to how a court would interpret their business model. “The Internet has become an integral part of
the video distribution chain as more and more content, including broadcast content, is migrating
online, and that the marketplace can be trusted to provide solutions for getting broadcast
programming to the public.”149
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